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Governing Health Risk by Buying Behaviour 
 
Sophie Harman 
 
Abstract This paper considers the role of conditional cash transfers as a mechanism 
of governing health risk by buying behaviour change in sexual practice. Conditional 
cash transfers have come to be identified as a potential solution to the problem of 
HIV prevention, and as such look likely to be applied throughout countries with 
high prevalence rates in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper considers the implications of 
two pilot studies in Tanzania and Malawi for governing the risk of HIV infection. It 
outlines the problem of behaviour change and individual rationality, the potential of 
conditional cash transfers as a relatively inexpensive programme with high 
outcomes, and some of limitations and implications of these initiatives for individual 
bodies, rationality and global health governance. The paper makes the argument that 
conditional cash transfers should be met with caution and that governing health risk 
by buying behaviour represents the intersection of biopolitical control with 
neoliberal forms of economic incentive through financial gain. The balancing of 
long term health needs with short term financial gain induces will to change 
behaviour: the problem being the sustainability of such change in the absence of 
financial gain and the long term consequences of constructing behaviour. 
Key words: Conditional Cash Transfers, Risk, neoliberalism, HIV/AIDS 
 
The 2010 International AIDS Conference in Vienna was surrounded by buzz over the role 
of conditional cash transfers as a mechanism of preventing HIV infection. Two trials in 
Malawi and Tanzania had shown that cash payments to schoolgirls and youths on condition 
of school enrolment or non-HIV infection had been an effective tool in efforts to prevent 
HIV. The relationship between health risk and individual behaviour has been at the crux of 
policy interventions within global health governance: how to make individuals responsible 
for their own actions and how to make people engage in non-risky behaviour. Cash solutions 
as a means of incentivising rational behaviour change or replacing alternative choices have 
become increasingly recognised as an effective means of fulfilling these objectives. This 
paper explores the role of conditional cash transfers as a means of governing health risk by 
buying behaviour change. It does so by first outlining the problem of behaviour change in 
governing global health, and second, the origins and purpose of conditional cash transfers as 
a solution to these problems. Third, the paper discusses the potential of such policies, and 
their record of success in alternative development strategies and what they mean for global 
health governance, before outlining the practical ramifications and shortcomings of such 
policies, and the logic that underpins them. In so doing the paper argues that despite the 
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short term appeal of such programmes, the widespread use of cash transfers, particularly 
those conditional on sexual health, should be met with caution and that the use of 
conditional cash transfers as a means of governing risk through buying behaviour presents 
an intersection of biopolitical control with neoliberal forms of economic incentive through 
financial gain. Where socio-economic factors become too difficult to address and individual 
choice and behaviour too problematic to change, economic incentive provides the only 
viable option for policymakers seeking to elicit short-term, measurable health outcomes.  
Risk is used to justify mechanisms of biopolitical surveillance, education and knowledge and 
neoliberal economic incentive. It is this intersection of biopolitics and neoliberalism that has 
come to underpin new ‘innovations’ that define global health governance. 
 
The Problem of Behaviour Change and the Role of the Individual 
Global health governance is concerned with the surveillance of emerging health threats, 
constructing political will to respond to health concerns, and the pursuit of change within 
individual behaviour as a means of eliciting better health outcomes for all. It is this third 
concern—behaviour change—that this paper engages with. Socialised and non-socialised 
health systems all have in common the need for individuals to take responsibility for their 
individual behaviour and personal health balanced with holistic and integrative systems of 
health and social care provided to some degree by the state and non-state actors. Individual 
behaviour is central to the pursuit of a long and healthy life, at the forefront of which is 
mitigating and preventing health risk. Individuals are exposed to a large swathe of 
information about health risks, perceptions of risks, and the need to take responsibility for 
their own health from national governments and intergovernmental bodies such as the 
World Health Organisation (WHO). With all risks, the onus is on the government or the 
international body to identify and raise awareness about the risk, provide medical treatments 
and prevention strategies, whilst the individual remains the main cite of responsibility for the 
management and acknowledgement of their own health risk. Regardless of any state or non-
state intervention, it is the individual that is the primary site of risk perception, and crucially, 
risk management. 
 
The logic underpinning such emphasis on the individual is the liberal understanding of the 
individual as a rational actor with a specific set of freedoms and responsibility over their 
 3 
body, which with the right kind of information will maximise their own self-interest, and 
safeguard against risk (see Williams 2008). The balance between this logic and the level of 
state intervention required to maximise individual behaviour change and choice underpins 
debate over reform of domestic national health structures from the National Health Service 
in the UK to global health campaigns launched by institutions such as the WHO and the 
World Bank. Incentivising behaviour change has become a central feature of rational choice 
models that according to Smith (2009), have adopted a new right approach combining 
classical economics and rational choice theory in such a way as to suggest that behaviour 
change is intrinsically linked to change in incentive. Incentives, regulation and choice have 
become the cornerstone of domestic healthcare systems (Smith 2009), and are now 
increasingly being applied to the global health problems such as HIV/AIDS. This has led to 
the state engaging in ‘moral power’ (Smith 2009: 217), that applied to the global context 
leads to a framing of risky, non-risky and moral policy making that focuses on the individual 
as the site of tension and change. The problem being that the widespread use of such 
incentives ‘assume rationality in a narrow sense of utility maximization’ (Smith 2009: 169). 
 
The degree to which individuals rationally maximise their own health and avoid risky 
behaviour is limited by two main factors. First, individual behaviour change, choice and 
perception of risk are determined by socioeconomic factors, such as income, education, and 
opportunities or lack thereof. Low socio-economic status and educational attainment can 
restrict self esteem and self-worth, thus putting a low premium on an individual’s concern 
about risk and life. Individuals living in low socio-economic conditions have limited access 
to resources that enable them to engage in less risky behaviour – whether educational and 
information services or basic health care provision. Limited self worth and a lack of services 
may lead individuals to perceive health risk as an everyday part of life, a form of pleasure, or 
a small risk in regard to more pressing concerns of lifestyle choices. This leads to the second 
explanation as to why individuals engage in risky behaviour, perception of risk. Individual 
habits and the perception of risk are bounded to different types of rational behaviour and 
pleasure. Rationality is about maximising an individual’s own well-being; this could be their 
pursuit of specific freedoms, well-being, money, family and individual health (Hindess 1988; 
Ward 2002). However, what is important and a source of pleasure differs between 
individuals and how they perceive and rationalise specific risks in regards to their own sense 
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of worth and individual happiness. For example, a form of risky behaviour such as over-
eating and obesity can be determined by socio-economic factors and issues of personal self 
esteem, but can also be associated with pleasure and enjoyment in eating and drinking. In 
this case an individual may rationalise that their day to day eating habits gave them pleasure 
against the risk of long term illness. The long term is often a central component of such 
rationality, the idea that health risk refers to an ‘other’ or a concern to be addressed in old 
age. Thus, health risk depends on individual perceptions of health and risk. What may seem 
irrational to some is rationalised differently by others. Individuals apply different rationalities 
to different health concerns, or displace health risks as an ‘other’ not relevant to them or 
their individual behaviour. Long-term health benefits alone are often not enough incentive 
to induce behaviour change in individuals.  
 
As a disease that is both a driver and driven by socio-economic inequality and poverty 
(Barnett and Whiteside 2002; Poku 2001; Whiteside 2002), the problems associated with 
governing individual behaviour change and perceptions of risk are particularly acute in the 
case of HIV/AIDS. HIV is a high risk infectious disease in countries with prevalence rates 
of over 3%. Yet, many people living in these countries engage in high risk sexual 
relationships. This can be explained by the fact they lack education or awareness of the 
transmission of HIV, that they are in a socio-economic position that restricts their ability to 
negotiate safe sex, or they rationalise unprotected sex in a way that offsets the risk with other 
gains, whether instant pleasure or gratification or child birth and familial stability. The 
problem here is thus of education, socio-economic status and individual pleasure and need. 
Socio-economic, cultural factors provide an extreme restriction on individual choice and 
behaviour change. For example, women may find negotiating safe sex both within and 
outside of marriage difficult due to the financial aspect to sexual relationships, whether it is 
from commercial sex work, to intergenerational relationships that offer financial security, or 
access to property rights through marriage. Cultural and socio-economic factors can limit the 
ability of individuals to access information and have autonomy over how they use such 
information. It therefore may appear a rational or logical choice for women to refuse or 
refrain from sexual intercourse with a partner who is either HIV positive, or perceived to be 
HIV positive, yet this depends on an individual’s autonomy to make such a choice and the 
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offsetting of such choice against much more immediate risks, such as loss of financial 
support and social stigma. 
 
Context is central to the ability of individuals to gain access to education and awareness 
campaigns, and their capacity to engage in such prevention strategies. Where education 
exists, it can be problematic. Confusion over biomedical research and the denial by state 
leaders and individuals that HIV is not the cause of AIDS has led to questions over what is 
the right kind of knowledge and who or what can or should be believed, and the role of the 
state in governing individual’s lives and their bodies (Youde 2007). This denial has arguably 
set back prevention efforts considerably. For example, once coming to power, Nelson 
Mandela remained silent over the emerging HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa, only in his 
later Presidency becoming vocal about the problem. His successor Thabo Mbeki denied the 
relationship between HIV and AIDS, and the current President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma 
publicly stated he was not worried about contracting HIV after having sexual intercourse 
with an HIV positive woman because he had had a shower afterwards (Jacob Zuma in BBC 
News 2006). This right kind of knowledge is not just evident within specific states and state 
leaders, the global HIV/AIDS response has promoted a limited prevention message that 
prioritises abstinence and being faithful to partners above all else. Controversial projects 
such as the US government’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
initiative and funding from religious denominations such as the Catholic church has seen an 
abundance of abstinence-based policies and little awareness or promotion of condom use as 
a key tool in prevention strategies (Harman 2010). Needle exchanges are not widespread 
globally and only minimally used within prisons as either pilot projects, prison-specific or a 
national policy in under ten countries (Lines et al 2006; Harm Reduction Coalition 2007). 
Whilst extreme, these policies represent a general unwillingness to recognise or discuss 
sexual intercourse, reproduction and pleasure within the global HIV/AIDS response. The 
onus is on educating individuals in a specific way that restricts their sex life, and thus reduces 
the risk, with little understanding of the meaning of sex or individual behaviour and the 
context in which behaviour is decided upon, and/or engaged with. Key to which is the 
perception of risk by both the policymaker and the individual. Individual choice and 
behaviour change thus becomes further restricted by the policy responses and global aid 
interventions tasked to combat the disease.  
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Responding to HIV/AIDS requires a complex combination of appealing to individual 
rationality and perceptions of risk to facilitate behaviour change and tackling the socio-
economic drivers of the disease. The core problem in preventing HIV transmission is its 
main mode of transmission is sexual intercourse. Reproduction, the continuation of the 
human race, relationships, families and forms of individual happiness and pleasure are 
dependent on sex. Hence it cannot be abolished. What it can be is regulated or practiced in a 
safe manner, yet this is increasingly problematic in a world where discussions of sex and 
pleasure are often seen as private issues, far from the domain of public policy-making, 
particularly that of the state and intergovernmental institutions. The result of which is a 
combination of interventions that deal first with socio-economic factors through what has 
become known as ‘multi-sectoral’ interventions, and second behaviour change initiatives that 
seek to alter individual choice and perception of risk. 
 
Multi-sectoral interventions refer to the need to involve every aspect of state and society in 
combating HIV/AIDS (Harman 2009). The onus here is on inclusion of the non-health 
sector as a means of recognising the relationship between HIV/AIDS and poverty and the 
exceptionalism of the disease, and the need to break stigma through making the issue 
everyone’s concern. The result of such a multi-sectoral approach emphasised by 
international institutions such as the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (hereafter the Global Fund) and the World Bank, and multiple governments across 
sub-Saharan Africa, has been a scaling up on HIV/AIDS interventions and mass 
participation to create a form of ‘AIDS biz’ (Pisani 2008) and wider awareness of the 
problem. This approach has been successful in raising awareness and facilitating an increase 
in participation but in turn has led the HIV/AIDS response to lose its focus, specifically in 
terms of individuals, their perception of risk and individual behaviour change (Harman 
2010). Participation is limited with inclusion in the practice of policy-making and agenda-
setting being limited to government ministries and international donors (Harman 2010). 
Hence innovative policy ideas and project trials tend to come from donors not the 
community. 
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Despite a shift towards addressing more socio-economic concerns and social stigma over the 
last ten years, changing sexual behaviour has been at the cornerstone of HIV/AIDS 
interventions since its identification as gay-related immunodeficiency syndrome (GRID). 
Behaviour change is done through a number of strategies: peer to peer learning, behaviour 
change communication, and public information campaigns emphasising the need to abstain, 
be faithful, use a condom (Harman 2010). However, these efforts have failed to make a 
breakthrough in regards to the differing perceptions of immediate and long-term risk, the 
rationality behind such perceptions, or the pursuit of pleasure. Whilst minimal success in 
preventing HIV transmission can be afforded to a host of problematic state-based and 
global policy-making, as well as socio-economic determinants, at the core of this problem is 
the individual and how to appeal to an individual’s rationality and perception of risk. Despite 
some success of education initiatives and peer to peer learning, there is a need to ‘innovate’ 
new ways of appealing to individual rationality and choice in behaviour change and the 
perception of risk. At the centre of which has been the need to provide new forms of 
incentive or purpose beyond health concerns to enable wider behaviour change in the short 
term to elicit long term global health goals.  
 
Recognition of the need for new incentives or ‘innovations’ to enhance progress in 
combating HIV/AIDS has become a dominant feature of global health governance over the 
last three years. The purpose of innovations and incentives has been to provide policy-
makers with new tools and mechanisms for combating infectious diseases. At the centre of 
these new innovations is the use of conditional cash transfers as a means of inducing 
behaviour change, particularly in regard to the transmission and spread of HIV. These 
conditional transfers offset the context to risk-taking and use financial incentive as a means 
of situating unsafe sex as not only a long term health risk, but a short term economic risk.  
Their application, however, raises several questions about the politics of governing individual 
behaviour and shaping perception of risk in global health governance to suggest that 
underpinning such approaches remains the liberal emphasis upon individual rationality that 
where lacking through education or socio-economic opportunity can be induced through 
economic means. Perceptions of risk are framed by the international donors that devise 
policy and trial projects, not by people living with HIV/AIDS or people living in 
communities affected by the disease. Hence there is both a problem in the design, logic and 
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application of cash transfers as a means of governing sexual behaviour. In developing this 
argument it is first important to identify what conditional cash transfers are and how they 
have been applied to HIV/AIDS governance in terms of buying behaviour. 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers and Buying Behaviour 
Conditional cash transfers originated in Latin America in the mid 1990s as a mechanism of 
reducing intergenerational transmission of poverty through investment in human capital and 
social protection. The logic behind such transfers was that services and supply-side public 
sector provision were available to the poor, the poor were just lacking in incentives or ability 
to use such services. Hence, cash transfers would be provided to poor households as an 
efficient means of assisting or facilitating demand for basic public services that would equip 
individuals with the basic capabilities of education, nutrition and primary healthcare. These 
basic capabilities would give poor households more equal opportunities in life (Caldes and 
Maluccion2009; deJanvry and Sadoulet 2006; Gertler 2004; Gilter and Bahham 2008; 
Skoufias and DiMaro 2008; Todd et al 2010). Conditional cash transfers are predominantly 
given to women who are perceived to be more reliable in spending money on the human 
development of their children than men (Gilter and Barham 2008: 271). Commonly, these 
transfers are conditional on child school enrolment, attendance and continuation from 
primary to secondary; adequate nutritional support to children and regular visits to 
healthcare centres to measure such nutritional efficacy. They have come to constitute a 
prominent feature of poverty reduction strategies throughout the Latin America, involving 
hundreds of thousands of households, and billions of dollars of investment. Two of the 
largest and flagship conditional cash transfer projects Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa 
Familia in Brazil had budgets of $2.5billion and $700million respectively by 2004 and a huge 
outreach to the number of families involved (Bradshaw 2008; deJanvry and Sadoulet 2006; 
Gertler 2004; Skoufias and DiMaro 2008; Todd et al 2010). The funding for such 
programmes draws from a mix of government budgets, and significant loans from the World 
Bank. 
 
Health has always been a central component of conditional cash transfers. However, cash 
transfers have only focused on health as a wider component of nutrition and social support 
to ensure long-term and sustained education for children from poor households (Barber and 
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Gertler 2009; Barham and Maluccio 2009). Good health beyond nutritional support or 
prevention strategies have not been a feature of the first generation of conditional cash 
transfers. The increase in the number of cash transfers, and their perceived success or 
innovation as a poverty reduction strategy in Latin America has led to a broadening of the 
possibilities for this tool, particularly in healthcare. It is within this wider context of the need 
for innovation and readily adaptable solutions to confront some of the problems of the 
poorest families and households in the world that conditional cash transfers as a means of 
HIV prevention were trialled. 
 
The first trial relating to HIV transmission and conditional cash transfers represented the 
standard format of transfer seen in Latin America. In January 2008 the World Bank launched 
a conditional cash transfer programme in Malawi to ensure uptake and continuation of girls 
aged 13-22 in education. Those that regularly attended school would receive $10-15 a month. 
The programmes was predominantly funded and managed by the Bank with additional 
funding and support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Spanish Impact 
Evaluation Fund (World Bank 2010a; Baird et al 2009). The outcome for education was 
positive, with 95% of the study staying in education, compared to 89% of the control group. 
However, the interesting finding that related this study more directly to HIV/AIDS was the 
finding that the HIV infection rate was at 1.2% compared to the 3% of the control group: a 
total lower prevalence of 60% (World Bank 2010a). World Bank Senior Economists 
attributed the causal explanation for this as being a decline in transactional sex, as 90% of 
the control group had received an average of $6.50 in gifts of money from partners (World 
Bank 2010a). It is this decline in prevalence associated with conditional cash transfers that 
have heightened the broader social and health impact of these initiatives, and provided 
further justification for their role as a key development tool. 
 
A Tanzanian trial cash transfer project differed from Malawi in that its specific focus and 
objective was the promotion of behaviour change through safe sex. In 2008, the Encouraging 
Safe Sexual Practices among Youth using Rewards project was established to see if cash transfers 
could act as an effective means of reducing risky sexual behaviour (World Bank 2008). The 
World Bank provided the majority of the $1.8million for the project that involved 2394 
young adults (World Bank 2010a). The trials were funded by the World Bank and the Hewlet 
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Foundation, and implemented by the Ifakara Health Institute, the World Bank Development 
Economics Research Groups, and the University of California at Berkeley. The study was 
conducted in two districts of Southern Tanzania - Kilombero and Ulanga – with participants 
aged 18-30 living in HIV ‘hotspots’ identified from the Demographic Surveillance System 
database and the 2006 STI prevalence study. 3000 participants from 10 villages would be 
regularly monitored for STI transmission over a one year period. These screenings would 
not test for HIV, but for STIs associated with risky sexual activity and HIV susceptibility: 
Chlamydia, gonorrhea, syphilis, trichomonas, mycoplasma genitalia and HSV-2 (herpes 
simpex virus 2), all of which besides HSV-2 can be cured. Crucially, for ethical reasons, the 
conditional cash transfers would not be tied to HIV status, despite the purpose of the study 
being to reduce HIV infection. Participants would participate in counselling and life skills 
sessions in support of their participation (World Bank 2008). The Tanzanian trial saw a 25% 
reduction in the number of participants who had previously engaged in unsafe sex.  
 
The outcomes of these two trials in Tanzania and Malawi were announced at the 2010 
International AIDS Conference in Vienna to good reaction. Both types of conditional cash 
transfer were seen to have a positive impact on the sexual health of the girls and young 
adults involved in the trials, with an overall change in sexual behaviour. The World Bank 
found that conditional cash transfers were effective means of delaying sexual activity in 
young girls. In addition, the Malawian project delayed marriage and pregnancy (Baird et al 
2009). The findings of these two trials received significant media attention in July 2010 in 
Africa, Europe, and North America, most of which was positive, and featured quotes from 
the World Bank’s Global HIV/AIDS Program Director David Wilson and the World Bank 
Senior Economist Damien De Walque who conducted the study and described the use of 
conditional cash transfers in a widely publicised press release as ‘creative new approaches to 
help people change their behaviour’ (World Bank 2010b). In addition, an independent study 
published as a working paper within the Bank’s Development Research Group described the 
use of cash transfers for HIV prevention as ‘win-win programs’ (Baird et al 2009). 
 
Creative and Innovative Potential of Conditional Cash Transfers 
Conditional cash transfers applied to more broad health and social interventions pose a 
number of potential benefits for behaviour change and a decline in risky sexual practices that 
 11 
reduce HIV infection. First, they have the potential to break the cycle between HIV 
infection and poverty by directly addressing basic capabilities such as access to education. 
Education is the primary arena beyond the family where young people learn about HIV and 
AIDS, and methods of preventing HIV infection. Moreover, greater education can lead to 
feelings of self worth, independence and employability among youths. These are integral 
factors in breaking the poverty cycle, especially for women. A lack of education can result in 
females having less access to information on sexual health, absence of skills to equip them in 
the workforce, and may lead to them relying on males for economic support. This in turn 
can increase the rate of transactional sex, intergenerational relationships and less female 
control over her body, all of which exacerbate HIV infection rates, particularly among young 
women.  
 
The case of young women points to a second benefit to conditional cash transfers, they have 
positive outcomes for women who are disproportionately infected and affected by 
HIV/AIDS (Harman 2011). For some cash transfers are effective means of promoting self 
esteem and empowerment (Vincent and Cull 2009). HIV/AIDS has been increasingly 
identified as a feminised epidemic as the impact and disproportional infection rates of the 
disease have become recognised over the last ten years. Conditional cash transfers support 
young women and girls in school, and gives them slight financial independence from men. 
Moreover, in giving the cash directly to female members of the household, women have 
more control over family budgets, and empowerment in managing such small grants from 
the government and institutions such as the World Bank. It can be argued, that this shifts the 
pattern of community driven development in which funding is often concentrated with the 
male village elder, or male-headed households to bring women to the centre of budgetary 
control and support, particularly towards young girls. Conditional cash transfers not only 
break the cycle of poverty and the feminised nature of the epidemic through education, but 
support a wider role of women as economically in control and independent of that of men. 
 
The third benefit of such transfers is that contrary to previous attempts to address the multi-
sectoral aspect of HIV/AIDS, they allow for measurable outcomes and success rates, and 
have a more targeted purpose other than the loose category of ‘community empowerment’ 
that previous World Bank strategies have emphasised. Previous interventions by the World 
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Bank have involved the rapid deployment of funds as a means of enhancing community 
participation within the global HIV/AIDS response. Conditional cash transfers develop the 
logic of such an approach – that communities are the best setting in which to educate and 
respond to the HIV challenge – but are more targeted and less loose-knit. They are more 
cost-effective, in that the cash transfer is relatively low and easy to administer once 
established with outcomes allocated to a specific funding stream (deJanvry and Sadoulet 
2006: 28).  
 
The final potential of conditional cash transfers as a means of reducing HIV infection rates 
through behaviour change is that the two trials of HIV-specific transfers in Malawi and 
Tanzania suggest that they work. Conditional cash transfers govern risk by not only reducing  
the socio-economic determinants of risk and individual behaviour through education and the 
provision of social safety nets, but change the perception of risk to that of immediate 
financial loss rather than long term health gain. Individual risk assessment thus becomes 
based on short term financial benefit as well as long term health and development outcomes. 
Both of which are arguably a win-win situation. However, the long-term effects and 
implications of such transfers are not so clear-cut.  
 
Problems and Perceptions of Risk 
The success of conditional cash transfers in achieving reduced HIV infection rests on the 
future ability to translate cash transfers into long-standing behaviour change that uses better 
health outcomes rather than financial gain as the incentive. There are several obstacles to 
achieving such change that are an intrinsic part of the conditional cash transfer as a 
mechanism of risk management. These problems are intrinsic to both the framing of risk in 
cash transfer design and the practical application of such programmes. The most common 
obstacles are those seen from previous cash transfer projects in Latin America: the utility of 
giving money for what people may do independently of the cash transfer (deJanvry and 
Sadoulet 2006: 6), the potential distortion they may have towards local labour supply 
(Skoufias and DiMaro 2008: 954), and the rate of such transfers as too low or too high to 
elicit action/distort local economies In regards to HIV/AIDS, the question more often than 
not becomes more normative as to whether conditional cash transfers ought to be used for 
something individuals should be doing. An individual’s long term and productive health should 
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be enough incentive to not engage in risky behaviour, however as the previous section 
suggests the risk is offset by a number of other risk factors and the context in which the 
individual engages in such behaviour. This normative argument sees a return to the type of 
debates outlined at the beginning of this paper between the need to provide better health 
outcomes for all through individual responsibility or through state intervention and 
provision. On the one hand, conditional cash transfers in the main continue to place the 
onus of better health outcomes on individual responsibility, with a lack of recognition of the 
socio-economic context in which decision-making takes place. On the other, interventions 
such as cash transfers maximise individual’s basic capabilities by providing them access to 
education and better health and thus greater equality of opportunity. However, such access is 
selective and raises several ethical questions about who is left out, why and what about their 
claims to state and World Bank support.  
 
The question of who is left out limits sustained behaviour change. Rewarding some with 
cash incentives can be seen as a disincentive for those who do not receive such cash. This is 
a problem endemic within the global response to HIV/AIDS, where local communities have 
increasingly been found to not engage in activities that help themselves and their community 
unless they receive financial support to do so. One senior official from the Tanzania 
Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) explained the current situation with the HIV/AIDS 
response in conversation in 2009 with the following analogy: when people used to get a 
snake in their house they would come together to work out how to get rid of the snake; now 
they shut the door and wait for some money to pay for them to get rid of the snake. This 
leaves policy-makers reliant on cash transfers in a bind. Not only do they have to prioritise 
who to give money to, the longer a project is sustained, the longer individuals rely on the 
money. The perception of risk thus comes about loss of income or welfare benefits, as well 
as the loss of life. The risk is thus both short and long term. Once the incentive is there, it is 
hard to remove it. Whilst behaviour may be learnt, the risk associated with unprotected sex 
will only be in regard to the long term, with short term problems of nutrition, education and 
financial loss remaining. Economic incentive through financial gain alone as a means of 
inducing rational self-promoting behaviour is not enough to sustain long term change. As 
once the incentive is not there, a trickle down effect or learnt through practice behaviour 
does not necessarily take place. Individuals are to a certain extent malleable to state and 
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global policy-making, but sex and sexual behaviour is an arena of social life in which they are 
often exempt. Cash incentives go part of the way to offset risk through financial reward, but 
ultimately such risk and reward is balanced against pleasure and reproduction. Cash transfers 
can regulate sex and sexual behaviour but they cannot abolish sex or promote abstinence 
altogether. 
 
A pertinent obstacle to the long term success of conditional cash transfers is that of sex. Safe 
sex through abstinence, one partner or condom use restricts reproduction and can impact on 
family planning. Conditional cash transfers incentivise unprotected sex only between non-
HIV positive couples or present the risk of HIV infection through unprotected sex as not a 
risk worth taking. For some this may be a useful side effect on family planning in countries 
with large populations, or for reducing mother to child transmission of HIV. For others this 
has significant implications for individual choice, the family and forms of social engineering 
that restricts childbirth within specific socio-economic demographics. 
 
Despite being presented as having a form of emancipatory potential for women, the 
emphasis placed on women as carers and more likely to invest money in their children 
perpetuates gendered norms of women-as-carers or women-as-mothers, and the attitudes of 
men towards their families and poor financial budgeting. In this sense, conditional cash 
transfers perpetuate the notion that women are the solution to the male problem of 
intergenerational and family poverty (Bradshaw 2008). As Bradshaw and Quiros Viquez 
(2008) argue, these transfers can be seen as an extension of what Chant (2006) calls the 
‘feminisation of poverty alleviation’ wherein women bear the burden of responsibility and 
are the site of international development initiatives. Initiatives such as conditional cash 
transfers are posed in such a way as to present an emancipatory function for women who are 
able to manage and control resources, and fulfil roles outside of the family. However, such 
logic presupposes women are not already performing such function and leaves open the 
question as to what happens once the money has gone (Bradshaw and Quiros Viquez 2008). 
Moreover, promoting behaviour change through cash incentive in women specifically 
positions women as economic objects malleable to financial pressure. Thus re-enforcing 
gendered dependencies on resources external to women’s labour. This is particularly relevant 
to HIV/AIDS which is increasingly feminised both in terms of the disproportionate number 
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of women infected and affected by the disease, as women bear the brunt of care for family 
and neighbours within local communities as well (Harman 2011). The introduction of 
conditional cash transfers as a key tool in the response to HIV/AIDS will most likely embed 
this burden of care and responsibility of responding to the disease at a local level, and further 
stereotypes of men as not responding or somehow not committed to the response to the 
epidemic.   
 
A fundamental problem with conditional cash transfers is the sovereignty and self-regulation 
of an individual’s body. The governance of HIV/AIDS has much to do with the regulation 
of the body and the construction of appropriate or particular behaviour, and the promotion 
of a right kind of knowledge. Conditional cash transfers play a significant and intrusive role 
within this. Having been designed in Washington DC cash transfers prevent solutions to a 
specific perception of risk put forward by policymakers such as the World Bank and its 
partner organisations. It is both the right kind of risk perception and how this perception 
translates into cash transfers practice that can be seen to represent a direct form of 
Foucault’s understanding of biopower, in which sex, sexuality and pleasure is regulated and 
organised in a manner that is seen as more productive for society, and crucially economic 
development (Foucault 1976: 140 – 141). Conditional cash transfers organise a specific form 
of sexuality that promotes abstinence or safe sex as a means of regulating the bodies of the 
poor. The distinction toward regulation of the poor in developing countries suggests the 
biopolitical dimension of segregation and hierarchy are clear mechanisms of governing the 
body (Foucault 1976: 141). Key components of conditional cash transfers are surveillance, 
data, monitoring, and segregation – essential sources of biopolitics, and for some crucial 
mechanisms of global health governance as bodily control (Elbe 2005).  According to Elbe, 
it is the language of risk that enables biopolitical power to justify, maintain and extend the 
power of institutions and sovereign states within global health governance through the 
framing of ‘risk groups’ and ‘risky behaviour’ (Elbe 2008: 178). Framing specific individuals 
as ‘high risk’, ‘risk groups’ that engage in ‘risky behaviour’ has the effect of segregation, 
stigma, racial metaphor, and in the extreme, eugenicist visions of society (Elbe 2008). 
Conditional cash transfers extend this framing of risk groups by accentuating difference in 
society and rewarding what comes to be constituted as non-risky behaviour with cash 
benefits.  
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Biopolitical mechanisms of control through surveillance, data collection, and behaviour 
change education and knowledge are not enough to regulate and change sexual behaviour. 
The efficacy and tools of biopolitical control are limited in their ability to regulate and reduce 
sexual activity and behaviour as they do not have the means or ability to offset pleasure, 
desire or reproduction. Risk, fear and stigma are all significant factors in eliciting change, but 
they are not cognizant of perceptions of fear and risk. Individual perceptions of risk and fear 
are dependent on socio-economic concerns and rest on long and short term needs and 
desires. To fully regulate the body and behaviour, risk must appeal to the short and long 
term and be context specific. High HIV/AIDS prevalence clusters in areas of extreme socio-
economic poverty and inequality, hence any methods of behaviour change need to address 
the immediate needs, concerns and risks of people living in poverty: they need to provide 
financial incentive for behaviour change and better health outcomes, and crucially: risk that 
such financial reward can be withdrawn. In fulfilling such a function, conditional cash 
transfers represent the intersection of biopolitical control of the body within wider processes 
of neoliberal political economy. The central justification of which is risk and perceptions of 
risk.   
 
Conditional Cash Transfers as intersection of biopolitics and neoliberalism 
Conditional cash transfers reflect a clear method of constructing political will and risk where 
risk and will is not forthcoming. This is a central component of the system of governance 
that constitutes the global response to HIV/AIDS, the use of economic incentive as a means 
of eliciting wider processes of change (Harman 2010). This is evident in the approach 
institutions such as the Global Fund and the World Bank take to promoting reform and 
adoption of multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS policies within national and local government 
structures (Harman 2010). Conditional cash transfers extend this mechanism, but engage in 
the broad category of political will through the wider construction of risk and perceptions of 
risk. Economic incentive has become an integral part of neoliberalism in practice. As an 
ideology, economic system or political project, neoliberalism refers to the reduction of state 
intervention and the primacy of the market in providing effective policy outcomes. At the 
core of such an ideology is an opening up of states to the free market competition and 
financialisation of the global political economy (see Harvey 2005; Harrison 2010). In terms 
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of global health care, such neoliberal policy has led to cuts of state-based health funding, and 
increase in public-private partnerships and the role of the private sector more generally in 
providing health interventions, and a need for market-based solutions to deliver better health 
outcomes, particularly in developing countries (Larkin 2008; Lee 2003). For neoliberalism to 
work in practice it requires incentives based on financial gain, whether it be the gain of 
public funding for a state or civil society organisation to implement a specific project, or for 
an individual to reform their own sexual behaviour. Economic incentives through financial 
gain provide the political will needed to elicit wider liberal reforms within a state or 
individual. In the case of conditional cash transfers and HIV/AIDS such liberal political will 
refers to the construction of rational actors that balance their long term health with their 
short term needs.  
 
A central project of global HIV/AIDS governance and global governance more broadly has 
been liberal reform that promotes democracy, representation, transparency (Harman 2010; 
Williams 2008) and the right sort of relationships between individuals and their bodies. 
Conditional cash transfers reflect the liberal underpinnings of such an approach in their 
emphasis on individual responsibility and the need for levelling-up of welfare and state-based 
incentives as a means of providing better health outcomes for all. Individuals are seen as 
malleable within behaviour change programs, that with the right kind of education and 
knowledge they will rationally choose to enhance their own self-interest. Increasingly such 
malleability has depended on context of individual choice and how they limit such choice. 
The purpose of conditional cash transfers is to address the context, i.e. socio-economic 
concerns, within the wider approach of multi-sectoralism, by using cash support. However, 
the conditional element of cash support suggests something far more reformist to the wider 
agenda of those that fund and promote such reforms. They introduce financial transaction 
and a shift in perception of risk, to make the risk more about financial loss than poor health 
outcomes. In so doing they create a dependency and segregation between the have and have 
nots. The financial incentive of such transfers suggests that when logic, education and 
specific knowledge bases fail to appeal to liberal, rational individuals, economic incentive 
through cash transfers will instigate such reforms. For such neoliberal policies to work 
requires a specific form of disciplinary neoliberalism, that relies less on legal-constitutional 
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structures normally associated with such a term (see Gill 2005), but more on systems of 
biopolitical control.  
 
A mix of neoliberal economic incentive through financial gain and key components of 
biopolitical control – surveillance, monitoring and the promotion of the right kind of 
knowledge – produces a new form of disciplinarity that uses risk as justification and a tool of 
political control. Risk is individualised and located in short term economic loss, and places 
less emphasis upon long-term sustained risk factors such as loss of life or ill health. Hence 
these mechanisms of control only provide short-term solutions and fail to address the 
rationality underpinning certain sexual behaviour, be that desire, pleasure, reproduction or 
the socio-economic contexts that offset the threat of illness or loss of life. Biopolitics 
presents a convincing argument for understanding processes of governing global health; 
political control over the body is a systematic function of global health governance, however, 
the body remains susceptible to individual desires and needs that education and knowledge 
control mechanisms fail to address alone. Economic incentive goes someway towards doing 
this, specifically in contexts of social, economic and political inequality. However the 
longevity of such programs may come into question. 
 
Implications for Global Health Governance 
Despite these cautionary implications, conditional cash transfers will become the new model 
in which global health governance operates. Cash transfers perform key roles essential to the 
main paradigm of global health: they are performance-oriented, show measurable results, 
engage in social protection, and can be replicated in multiple different contexts. Donors, 
states and institutions can devise projects cheaply and quickly and show measurable 
outcomes as a means of showing immediate results. Cash transfers are presented as having 
great success and potential by lead institutions within global health such as the World Bank, 
development policy discussions, and academic publications (see Barrientos et al 2010). Cash 
transfers will not only be limited to HIV/AIDS, but will be applied to multiple health 
contexts, as health planning adopts wider trends trialled within global AIDS policy, and the 
immediate, cost-effective ‘benefits’ become clear. 
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These ‘benefits,’ however, must be measured against the following practical implications for 
the future of global health policy more broadly. First, global health interventions will 
continue to reflect domestic healthcare reform. Specifically in the emphasis on incentivised 
behaviour for both individuals and health professionals and the use of regulation as a form 
of ensuring standardisation and the right kind of behaviour change in western health 
systems. Second, global health will see a continuation of the marketisation of individual 
behaviour as the choices they make are not conditioned by their liberal need to rationally 
maximise their own health but economic gain and reward relative to that of the health 
market. Third, individuals not states or social groups will become the central contention and 
site of delivery within global health governance. Failure to provide better health for all will 
become conditioned by morally just or wrong behaviour of individuals identified by states 
and international institutions, leading to wider contradictions within, and thus ultimately an 
undermining, of the right to health. Fourth, the use of incentives will skew the balance 
between the state, the market and the individual within global health governance, leading to 
a growth of the market, the responsibility of the individual in the provision of better health 
outcomes, and the re-assertion of a co-ordination-based management role for the state and 
international institutions. This will result in a diffusion of responsibility among multiple 
actors in which the individual will be blamed for any failure in policy, as opposed to those 
who design and implement cash incentive programmes. 
 
The role of conditional cash transfers in governing risk through buying behaviour rests on 
the individual’s role in allowing for their behaviour to be brought, and the context which 
affects such a choice. The emphasis on economic incentive for reform in global HIV/AIDS 
governance, and the consistent call for new innovations within global health governance 
would suggest that this element of individual reform through disciplined economic incentive 
and biopolitical control will remain, and in many ways frames how global health governance 
operates and is understood. Global health governance is about governing the body and the 
extension of biopolitical control as a means of changing individual behaviour and 
relationships within the wider state and neoliberal global political economy. When 
biopolitical control mechanisms and incentives fail, economic conditionalities and neoliberal 
forms of private understandings of the self, other and profit come into play. What is 
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constituted as risk and perceptions of risk are as much about financial gain and incentive as 
they are about health outcomes and the threat of infectious disease. 
 
Conclusion  
Conditional cash transfers are a new mechanism of promoting behaviour change and 
increasing HIV prevention strategies within global health governance. Their backing and 
support from the World Bank and interest from wider actors in global health suggest they 
are going to become a prominent feature and tool in the global politics of health and disease. 
Conditional cash transfers govern health risk by buying behaviour and altering perceptions 
of risk by introducing economic incentive. Perceptions of risk are specifically framed by 
policymakers in global centres of decision-making. Risk to good health, longevity in life and 
familial support is context specific, and whilst vitally important to people living in 
developing countries, is often offset by more immediate concerns of economic support and 
well-being. Providing welfare grants and framing ‘bad’ behaviour as an economic risk seeks 
to address the problem of socio-economic determinism in which these decisions are made 
through providing short term solutions for both immediate and long term gain. Conditional 
cash transfers have the potential to change behaviour and provide a breakthrough in 
prevention strategies. However, their usage in combating HIV/AIDS and adoption as a key 
tool within global health governance should be met with caution. 
 
Cash transfers rest on a narrow conception of rationality that suggests economic gain is the 
most effective means of incentivising individuals to maximise their own health utility whilst 
ignoring fundamental problems such as pleasure, insecurity, reproduction, desire, property 
rights or violence. The emphasis of conditional cash transfers is on abstinence and protected 
sex at the cost of wider questions of reproduction and pleasure. The success of conditional 
cash transfers in HIV prevention is dependent on coverage, longevity and individual 
responses to such conditionalities and rationality. They provide an additional burden for 
women who are the main site and providers of these incentive schemes and re-enforce those 
gender stereotypes of women-as-carers that perpetuate inequality. Education projects such as 
that of the Malawi scheme have the potential to address some of these concerns, but cash 
transfers conditional on sexual health do not.  
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Cash transfers conditional on the sexual health and behaviour of individuals raises specific 
ethical questions as to what constitutes morally right behaviour and wrong behaviour by 
rewarding the good and penalising the bad with a loss of financial support: ‘good’ behaviour 
is rewarded through cash transfer and ‘bad’ behaviour is stigmatised. What constitutes such 
moral behaviour is dependent on the economic modelling of institutions such as the World 
Bank and the states in which these policies operate. Cash transfers introduce the notion of 
morally good or bad, right and wrong sexual behaviour and as such undermine any rights-
based approaches to people living with HIV, efforts to reverse the stigma surrounding the 
disease, and accentuate problems of self esteem for those who do not receive the money or 
have been withdrawn from the programme. 
 
As a component of global health governance, cash transfers represent the extension of the 
marketisation of global health to the individual. Market reform of the health sector has 
occurred within the state and economy in health systems throughout the world, from 
western states, to developing countries, to those states rebuilding health systems after 
conflict. Cash incentives for behaviour change have extended the market to the governance 
of individual bodies. As such, they exemplify the merging of biopolitical control and 
neoliberal reform that has come to underpin global health governance. Risk and the 
perception of risk are used as a key justification for the application and extension of such 
mechanisms. Economic incentive through financial gain, monitoring and surveillance, the 
reproduction of specific forms of risk-adverse knowledge and behaviour and the 
stigmatisation of ‘risk groups’ are central components of the management of health risks by 
institutions such as the World Bank and the Global Fund in responding to the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. These mechanisms fail to address the long-term socio-economic and short-term 
individual rationalities that drive unsafe sex such as reproduction and pleasure, but provide a 
short-term solution that has more to do with bodily control than risk aversion. Hence, 
HIV/AIDS has come to be governed as a risk by buying behaviour. 
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